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From the time of its discovery and exploration in the early nine-
teenth century, Antarctica long received only sporadic attention from
the international community. Apart from occasional conflicts arising
from competing territorial claims-Great Britain and Argentina, for
instance, claimed overlapping sectors south of the Falkland/Malvinas
Islands as early as 1908-the Antarctic continent attracted mostly the
interest of whalers and explorers rather than lawyers.
Even after the Treaty of Washington of 1959,' which set up the
present cooperative regime,2 the international community treated the
Antarctic continent with benign neglect. The 1970's marked the
beginning of a new, growing interest in Antarctica reflected both in
legal scholarship 3 and in the undertaking of a multifarious diplomatic
t Professor of International Law, University of Siena, Italy; Visiting Professor,
Cornell Law School (1985-86).
1. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
The full text of the Treaty appears in the Appendix, infra. The Antarctic Treaty was an
offshoot of the International Geophysical Year, a non-governmental project involving
national members of the International Council of Scientific Unions. See generally BULLIS,
THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR (1973).
2. The Antarctic "regime" includes the Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, and the
body of recommendations adopted by the Consultative Parties pursuant to articles IX and
XII, as well as the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna,
June 2-13, 1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, T.I.A.S. No. 6058 (1966), modified in 24 U.S.T. 1802,
T.I.A.S. No. 7692 (1973); the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1,
1972, 27 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S. No. 8826 (entered into force Mar. 11, 1978) [hereinafter cited
as Seal Convention]; and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, May 20, 1980, 80 Stat. 271, T.I.A.S. No. 10240 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as CCAMLR].
3. It would be impossible to provide an exhaustive list of the literature on the subject.
The following books, however, are worth mentioning for the useful overview and biblio-
graphical reference they provide. Regarding the political and legal questions involved in
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effort, first among the Consultative Parties to the Treaty and later in
the United Nations.4
Various factors account for the growing interest in Antarctica.
First, states placed a strong emphasis in the mid-1970's on the new
international law of common resources, including the need to conserve
resources and to fashion principles of redistributive justice in areas
otherwise subject to the regime of freedom (e.g., the seabed, outer
space, and Antarctica). Second, following the 1973 oil crisis, the
industrialized world demonstrated spasmodic concern for new sources
of energy. This concern fostered interest in the significant reserves of
coal and hydrocarbons that might be present in Antarctica. Third,
world powers increasingly perceived the Antarctic region as poten-
tially a strategic zone in the event of armed conflict because of the easy
control Antarctica would provide over maritime communications
between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.5
Although at least the first two factors mentioned above require
re-evaluation in light of current economic realities,6 the task of devel-
oping a legal framework for exploration and development of mineral
resources in Antarctica remains a priority among the states party to
the Antarctic Treaty. As of October 7, 1985, seven meetings had
taken place within the Consultative Group of the Antarctic Treaty.7
Work on the elaboration of a set of principles on mineral resources,
however, began in the early 1970's. In 1973, a meeting of experts,
the Antarctic regime, see F. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS (1982); THE NEW
NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES (J. Charney ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Charney]; P. QUIGG, A POLE APART: THE EMERGING ISSUE OF ANTARCTICA (1983).
For an early comphrehensive study of Antarctica, see G. BA'rTAGLINI, LA CONDIZIONE
DELL'ANTARTIDE NEL DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE (1971).
4. See Hayashi, The Antarctica Question in the United Nations, 19 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 275 (1986).
5. This perception is reflected, for example, in the Statement on Foreign Policy issued
by the President of the United States on the eve of the Falkland/Malvinas Conflict, which
reiterated: "The United States has significant political, security, economic, environmental,
and scientific interests in [Antarctica]." Question of Antarctica, Study Requested Under
General Assembly Resolution 38/77, Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR Annex
(Agenda Item 66), U.N. Doc. A/39/583, vol. III at 126 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Report
of the Secretary General].
6. Limited growth in the major industrial countries, coupled with the upsurge of the
foreign debt of less-developed countries, has determined a shifting of focus from the long-
term ambitious objective of the New International Economic Order to the more pressing
short-term goals of economic recovery, reduction of unemployment, and reduction of the
financial exposure of less-developed countries to the banking system of the Western World.
At the same time, limited growth and conservation of energy sources have greatly reduced
the dramatic concern for oil supplies that characterized the industrial world in the 1970's.
7. The latest meeting of the Consultative Group was held in Paris in October, 1985,
just days before the Antarctica Symposium held at the Cornell Law School on October 7-8,
1985. Minerals meetings also took place in Wellington, June, 1982 and January, 1983; in
Bonn, July, 1983; in Washington, January, 1984; in Tokyo, May, 1984; and in Rio de
Janeiro, summer, 1984. A report on meetings up to 1984 can be found in ASOC, Report on
the Antarctic Minerals Meeting, Washington, D.C., 1984 (unpublished mimeograph).
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sponsored by the Nansen Foundation, addressed the question of
whether possible mineral activities would be compatible with the
Antarctic Treaty. 8 Although the Nansen Foundation Report indi-
cated that several states considered commercial exploitation of
Antarctic minerals a breach of the Treaty-especially because of fore-
seeable adverse effects on scientific research and the risk of contamina-
tion-the issue nevertheless remained on the Consultative Meetings'
agenda.
At the Oslo meeting in 1975, mineral exploitation was considered
for the first time at a substantive level. The subsequent meeting, the
Ninth, gave rise to the first major effort to define a set of guidelines on
the subject. Such guidelines are found in Recommendation X-1,
adopted following a group of experts' report elaborating and enlarging
a document previously prepared by the Scientific Committee on
Antarctic Research (SCAR) on the risk of mineral activities for the
Antarctic ecosystem. These guidelines, later reiterated in Recommen-
dation XI-1, provided a general framework of principles on which fur-
ther negotiations were to be based.9
At present, negotiations are continuing within the Consultative
Parties group. A special meeting on the prospective mineral regime
was held in Bonn from July 11-22, 1983, and the ad hoc working
group has since discussed an informal project prepared by its Chair-
man, Ambassador Beeby of New Zealand. 10 In May, 1984, a parallel
set of draft articles, largely following the Chairman's scheme, was
presented by the Federal Republic of Germany."1
This diplomatic ferment bears witness to the Consultative Parties'
intention to maintain an "active and responsible" role with respect to
the possible future management of Antarctic resources. This involves
the conviction that an eventual mineral regime must be rooted in the
Antarctic Treaty system and that the special provision of article IV
concerning the freezing of claims and relative objections must be
preserved. 12
8. Nansen Foundation, Antarctic Resources, Report from the Meeting of Experts,
May 30-June 10, 1973, reprinted in U.S. Antarctic Policy: U.S. Policy with Regard to Min-
eral Exploration and Exploitation in the Antarctic: Hearing before the Subcomn. on Oceans
and International Environment of the Senate Conmm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 68 (1975).
9. Recommendation XI-1, reprinted in Charney, supra note 3, at 329.
10. Beeby Draft: Antarctic Mineral Resources Regime, Jan. 28, 1983, revised Mar. 29,
1984 (on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as
Beeby Draft].
11. West German Draft: Antarctic Mineral Resources Regime, May 15, 1984 (on file
at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as German
Draft].
12. Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. IV.
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The prospect of impending mineral exploitation in Antarctica 3
has also worked to bring Third World demands for universal partici-
pation in Antarctic decision-making within the jurisdiction of the
U.N., possibly of an ad hoc committee. Spurred by this demand, the
Secretary General prepared a comprehensive study, together with a
document containing the views of a great many member states. 14
These documents were issued in late October, 1984. Chapter IV of the
study deals with mineral resources in Antarctica.
On the basis of these preliminary observations, several important
issues arise and require more substantive treatment: (1) whether min-
eral activities are compatible with the Antarctic Treaty; (2) whether
and on what conditions the setting up of a mineral regime may be
lawful and valid under customary international law; (3) what features
the substantive content of the regime should have to be acceptable to
the Consultative Parties and to other interested states who may want
to accede to the regime; and (4) what institutions can be envisaged for
implementing the mineral regime.
I. THE LAWFULNESS OF MINERAL EXPLORATION
AND DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY
The Antarctic Treaty does not specifically address the issue of
mineral activities. Therefore, the question of their admissibility is one
of treaty interpretation. One view has emerged-as mentioned ear-
lier-that the proposed mineral activities in Antarctica would violate
the Antarctic Treaty. 15 They would do so because of their alleged
prejudice to pure scientific research and their inescapable contamina-
tion of the environment, with consequent frustration of the fundamen-
tal objectives of the Treaty set forth in the Preamble and in articles II
and III. On the other hand, it has been maintained that the "peaceful
purpose" clause in article I(1) must be understood to include mineral
activities within the sphere of permissible uses of Antarctica-insofar
as they are neither hostile nor military in nature.16
13. The actual availability of Antarctic mineral resources, as well as the economics of
their exploitation, are the subject of abundant literature. For a detailed discussion, see
Zumberge, Potential Mineral Resource Availability and Possible Environmental Problems in
Antarctica, in Charney, supra note 3, at 115; Pontecovo, The Economics ofthe Resources of
Antarctica, id. at 155. See also the excellent study proposed by the U.N. Secretary General,
supra note 5.
14. Report of the Secretary General, supra note 5. This report includes the views
expressed by fifty-four States.
15. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16. For this view, see Bilder, The Present Legal and Political Situation in Antarctica, in
Charney, supra note 3, at 167, 186.
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As of today, this later view has largely prevailed among the Con-
sultative Parties to the Treaty. The negotiations on the mineral regime
referred to above have begun and are being pursued based on the
assumption that mineral activities are per se consistent with the objec-
tive and purpose of the Antarctic Treaty.
Another question is whether, independently of the Treaty, an
obligation to refrain from mineral activities in Antarctica flows from
the 1977 Consultative Parties Recommendation establishing a morato-
rium on resource exploration and exploitation. This Recommendation
was adopted at the Ninth Consultative Meeting and is addressed both
to parties to the Treaty and to non-parties. Paragraph 8 recommends
that governments "urge their nationals and other states to refrain from
all exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources while
making progress toward the timely adoption of an agreed regime con-
cerning Antarctic mineral resource activities." 17
Is such a recommendation capable of barring states from engag-
ing in mineral activities in Antarctica? In answering this question, it
might appear logical to distinguish between parties to the Treaty and
third states; one could argue, for example, that despite the language of
the recommendation, third parties may be free to consider the recom-
mendation irrelevant to them as res inter alios acta. But such a dis-
tinction is only of theoretical interest. This recommendation is not a
binding instrument imposing legal obligations on states and their
nationals with respect to Antarctic resources. This recommendation is
only intended to implement a policy of voluntary restraint which
might become legally binding only upon its incorporation in interna-
tional or national instruments imposing unambiguous legal obligations
on states and their nationals.
Even assuming arguendo that such a recommendation has
acquired the status of a binding instrument, it is clear that the morato-
rium established therein refers only to actual exploration and exploita-
tion and is intended to prevent an unregulated race to mineral fields in
Antarctica. Under the 1977 moratorium, the Consultative Parties are
not only free to undertake consultations, but are morally and politi-
cally bound to do so pursuant to article IX, paragraph 1 of the
Treaty.18
Within the Treaty framework, the real issue with respect to min-
eral activities in Antarctica is that of agreeing upon the modalities of
mineral exploration and development and setting up appropriate safe-
guards for other competing interests. In particular, these interests
17. Recommendation IX-1, para. 8, reprinted ii Charney, supra note 3, at 294.
18. See Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. IX, para. 1 (establishing a framework
for living resources).
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include the protection of the environment, the position of the so-called
claimant states, and non-militarization.
Despite the very tentative stage of the projects for the mineral
regime, current negotiations show a strong sense of obligation toward
the Antarctic environment. It is true that the group of industrialized
states may favor more strongly a rapid development of mineral activi-
ties, while the Antarctic Treaty developing countries, especially the
Latin American group, may place paramount interest in the protection
of the Antarctic environment. However, all the Consultative Parties
agree that the establishment of environmental safeguards is an impera-
tive deriving from the trust accepted under the Antarctic Treaty. This
is not surprising, since the functioning of the Treaty has long shown a
solidarity that tends to blur traditional dividing lines and distinctions
such as those between North-South and East-West.
The other major factor that will condition the development of a
legal regime for mineral activities within the Treaty system is the spe-
cial territorial status of Antarctica. 19 Article IV of the Antarctic
Treaty temporarily freezes existing claims and relative objections.
Future activities connected to the exploration and development of
mineral resources will obviously affect this situation. For the first
time, in fact, activities in Antarctica will be directed neither to purely
scientific goals nor to mere conservation. Mineral exploitation of non-
renewable resources is normally a corollary of national sovereignty;
contemporary international law suggests this principle in the close
connection between title over the territory and the concept of perma-
nent sovereignty over natural resources. It is essential, therefore, that
however flexible the future regime may be, it will take into considera-
tion the necessity of neither jeopardizing nor confirming territorial
claims-as, for instance, by granting exclusive oversight and control
powers to one or more claimant states-until a definitive solution of
the territorial claims problem has been reached. As will be discussed
later,20 current projects only partially succeed in this task.
The non-militarizaton principle may prove rather easy to estab-
lish in the future mineral regime by incorporating a clause similar to
that of article I(1) of the Antarctic Treaty. The application of the
peaceful use principle to installations, structures, and equipment used
for mineral exploration and exploitation will be more meaningful if
accompanied by the extension to these activities of the inspection
19. See generally Conforti, Territorial Claims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to Deal
With an Old Problem, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 249 (1986).
20. See infra Part III.
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mechanism which today applies successfully to scientific stations and
expeditions.21
II. THE LAWFULNESS OF MINERAL EXPLORATION AND
DEVELOPMENT UNDER CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The current debate over the future of Antarctic mineral resources
is not limited to the parties to the Antarctic Treaty. The group of non-
aligned countries, in particular, has been increasingly active with
respect to Antarctica in view of the considerable importance they
attach to the continent in terms of resources and global develop-
ment.22 In this context, it is obvious that the non-aligned group will
be reluctant to accept a scenario in which the decision-making process
regarding mineral activities remains in the hands of the Consultative
Parties alone.
Although the Antarctic Treaty's successful role in providing an
effective legal framework for scientific cooperation and conservation
initiatives is generally recognized, the emerging view among less-
developed countries is that a broader international arrangement is
needed to guarantee that economic activities carried out in Antarctica
are for the benefit of all of humanity. This concept underlies the posi-
tion taken by the Conference of Heads of State or Government on
Non-Aligned Countries held in New Delhi in March, 1983, which
passed a resolution stating:
The Heads of State or Government noted that the Continent of Antarctica
has considerable environmental, climatic, scientific and potential economic sig-
nificance to the world. They expressed their conviction that, in the interest of
all mankind, Antarctica should continue forever to be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes, should not become the scene or object of international dis-
cord and should be accessible to all nations. They agreed that the exploration
of the area and the exploitation of its resources shall be carried out for the
benefit of all mankind, and in a manner consistent with the protection of the
environment of Antarctica . . . . The Heads of State or Government, while
noting that relevant provisions of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 related to inter-
national cooperation in the area, considered that in view of increasing interna-
tional interest in the Antarctic, the United Nations, at the thirty-eighth session
of the General Assembly, should undertake a comprehensive study on Antarc-
tica, taking into account all the relevant factors, including the Antarctic
Treaty, with a view to widening international cooperation in the area.23
21. Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. I.
22. For a full discussion of the views of non-aligned countries, see Hayashi, supra note
4.
23. This resolution is reprinted in an annex to the request presented by Antigua and
Barbuda and Malaysia for the inclusion of a supplementary item concerning Antarctica in
the agenda of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. See U.N. Doe. A/38/193
at 2-3 (1983).
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Following this resolution, the representatives of Antigua and Bar-
buda and Malysia requested, in a letter of August 11, 1983, the inclu-
sion of Antarctica in the agenda of the General Assembly. 24 Despite
the reservations expressed by the Consultative Parties2 5 with respect to
this request, the General Assembly resolved to inscribe the question
on the agenda of its thirty-eighth session and to give the Secretary
General the mandate to prepare the study on Antarctica mentioned
above.26 The question once again appears on the agenda of the Gen-
eral Assembly at its fortieth session.27
Against this background of active and widespread interest in Ant-
arctica, the question of the lawfulness of mineral activities under cus-
tomary international law is the threshhold issue in the present
negotiating process. Unlike the Law of the Sea Conference, where
negotiations for the drafting of the controversial mineral regime of the
international seabed area saw the participation of virtually all the
states of the world, present negotiations on the Antarctic mineral
regime are conducted within the rather small circle of states party to
the Antarctic Treaty. These states, however, are not free to shape a
mineral regime accounting only for the legal framework of the
Antarctic Treaty. Rather, they must conduct their negotiations with
due regard for the evolving body of customary international law appli-
cable to the exploitation of resources beyond national jurisdiction.
Consideration of customary international law is essential for several
reasons, regardless of whether applicable norms of customary interna-
tional law have become rules of jus cogens.28 First, the Antarctic
24. See supra note 5.
25. See Letter of Oct. 5, 1983 (from the Australian Permanent Representative to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary General), in which the following view was stated
on behalf of the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty:
Revision or replacement of the Treaty which is now being suggested by Malaysia
and Antigua and Barbuda would undermine this system of international law and
order in Antarctica with very serious consequences for international peace and co-
operation. It is unrealistic to think that, in the present state of world affairs, a new
or better legal regime for Antarctica could be agreed upon. The undermining of
the Treaty could open the way to an arms race in the region and might lead to new
territorial claims. It would not serve the interest of any country, or group of coun-
tries, if Antarctica became an area of international conflict and discord.
It is for these reasons that the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty have
serious reservations about the initiative by the Governments of Malaysia and Anti-
gua and Barbuda and about any attempt to revise or replace the present Treaty
system.
38 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 140), U.N. Doc. A/38/439/Rev. 1, at 2 (1983).
26. Resolution adopted at the General Assembly, 97th Plenary Meeting of 15 Decem-
ber 1983. U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/77 (1983).
27. See Hayashi, supra note 4.
28. See infra note 42.
[Vol. 19:163
MINERAL EXPLOITATION
Treaty itself contains a clear reference to international law.29 Second,
more than twenty-five years have passed since the adoption of the
Treaty; in the meantime, new principles and new norms of interna-
tional law have emerged with respect to the legal status of spaces
beyond national jurisdiction. Third, in view of the fast-approaching
deadline of 1991 for the Treaty's eventual revision,30 it would hardly
be defensible on policy grounds to develop a mineral regime openly
inconsistent with newly established or emerging principles of custom-
ary international law. This paper will discuss the prospects of an
Antarctic mineral regime in light of these principles.
A. COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
The first and most important principle of customary international
law that must be applied to any minerals regime in Antarctica is that
of the common heritage. This principle has become the leitmotif in
the progressive development of international law governing the use of
areas beyond national jurisdiction. Its specific recognition can be
found in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 31 as well as in the Moon
Treaty of 1979;32 reference to this principle was also made in the
Outer Space Treaty of 1967.33 Despite the fact that its precise legal
implications still remain rather uncertain, there is general consensus
that the common heritage principle tends to create an obligation for
individual states to use the resources of the international seabed area
as well as those of outer space in a way that promotes not only
national interests, but the well-being of mankind as a whole.
The Antarctic Treaty does not contain a specific reference to the
common heritage principle, and it could not have done so because, in
1959, the expression was not yet part of the international vocabulary.
The application of the common heritage principle to Antarctica, how-
ever, has been advocated in legal literature34 and diplomatic pro-
29. "[N]othing in the present treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or
the exercise of the rights, of any state under international law with regard to the high seas
within that area." Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. VI.
30. Id, art. XII, para. 2(a).
31. "The area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind." United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, art. 136, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention].
32. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1979, art. 11(1), U.N. Doc. A/34/664, reprinted in
18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979) (entered into force July 11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Moon
Treaty].
33. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty].
34. Pinto, The International Community and Antarctica, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 675.
678 (1978); Honnold, Thaw in International Law? Rights in Antarctica Under the Law of
19861
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nouncements. 35 Some states have gone so far as to suggest that even
the work on a mineral regime currently undertaken by the Consulta-
tive Parties should cease until an international administration is
established. 36
I do not believe that the latter view correctly represents the legal
implications of the common heritage principle on mineral activities in
Antarctica. It postulates a standstill obligation, not only with respect
to actual exploration and exploitation of resources, but also with
respect to negotiations on this matter amongst the states who have
accepted the primary responsibility of guaranteeing peaceful access to
and use of Antarctica.
On the other hand, I do not share the view advanced in legal
literature and state practice that the common heritage principle should
not definitely be made applicable to Antarctic resources. 37 The cor-
rect approach to this problem requires that two distinct issues be kept
separate. The first is whether the common heritage principle is appli-
cable at all to Antarctica. The second, which arises only in the case of
an affirmative answer to the first, is whether the development of a min-
eral regime restricted to the Consultative Parties necessarily consti-
tutes a violation of the common heritage principle for lack of universal
participation.
1. General Applicability of the Common Heritage
Principle to Antarctica
No formal instrument directly sanctions the application of the
common heritage principle to Antarctica. The extent to which the
continent's legal regime already reflects common heritage principles,
however, implies recognition that the principle imposes at least some
Common Spaces, 87 YALE L. J. 804, 844 (1981); Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea:
Rethinking the Current Legal Dilemmas, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 915 (1981).
35. See the Mauritions-sponsored resolution adopted on August 7, 1985, by the Heads
of States of the Organization of African Unity, whose first paragraph of the operative part
declares "Antarctica to be the common heritage of mankind." (Unpublished text of the
Resolution on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
36. Report of the Secretary General, supra note 5.
37. For the literature, see Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty Regime: A Workable Compro-
mise or a 'Purgatory of Ambiguity'?, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 195, 220-25 (1985);
Wolfrum, The Use of Antarctic Non-living Resources: The Search for a Trustee?, in
ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE: CONFLICTING INTERESTS, COOPERATION, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 143, 147 (R. Wolfrum ed. 1984) (proceedings of
an interdisciplinary symposium organized by the Institut fdr Internationales Recht an der
Universitift Kiel, 22-24 June 1983); Rich, A Mineral Regime for Antarctica, 31 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 709, 713 (1982). For state pronouncements, see the views expressed by Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Great Britain, and the Consultative Parties generally, in the document
annexed to the Secretary General's Study on Antarctic, supra note 14, as well as the views
expressed by the same states in the discussion at the General Assembly in 1983, 38 U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/38/PV at 13 (1983).
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obligations. Ironically, it is the remarkable success that the numeri-
cally limited Antarctica group has achieved in preserving the conti-
nent from nationalistic aims and unilateral assertion of claims that
evidences the Consultative Parties' sense of obligation and responsi-
blity, not only inter se, but toward the international community as a
whole. I would even dare say that the present Antarctic regime 38 rep-
resents the only existing example of substantive implementation of the
common heritage principle.39
Once we recognize this proposition, it is easier to accept the exist-
ence of a set of substantive obligations binding upon those who have
access to or who are preparing to obtain access to the mineral
resources of Antarctica. In defining such obligations, an analogy can
be drawn with the criteria developed by Professor Conforti in a semi-
nal article of 1977. 40 Professor Conforti correctly argues that
although unilateral exploitation of the deep seabed may not be prohib-
ited absolutely by U.N. resolutions and by the work of the Third Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, nonetheless, states are bound by the
established and emerging principles of international law limiting their
freedom to use sea resources.
Applying this framework of inquiry to Antarctica, the first and
most obvious obligation that arises under the common heritage princi-
ple requires states to abstain from asserting claims to exclusive control
or appropriation over areas in which mineral activities will be carried
out. In this situation, the common heritage principle plays a concom-
mitant role with article IV of the Antarctic Treaty in preventing pio-
neering mineral activities from being used as the first step in a process
to establish jurisdiction over specific areas of the continent. From the
point of view of customary international law, therefore, one reaches
the same conclusion reached under the Antarctic Treaty: the future
mineral regime will have to lay down a principle that precludes claims
of sovereignty based upon occupation of a given area for purposes of
mineral exploration or exploitation.
The second obligation of a substantive character stemming from
the common heritage principle involves allocation of a fair share of
mineral resource revenues for the benefit of the international commu-
nity. This allocation would be required as long as mineral resource
38. See supra note 2.
39. The common heritage principle in the Outer Space Treaty, supra note 33, and in
the Moon Treaty, supra note 32, remains at the stage of mere enunciation. Part XI of the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 31, remains a victim of the overly ambitious
and burdensome bureaucratic apparatus that is to implement the common heritage princi-
ple with respect to the seabed.
40. Conforti, Notes on the Unilateral Exploitation of the Deep Seabed, 4 ITAL. Y.B.
INT'L L. 3-19 (1978-79).
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activities were being carried out. The rate of such a levy would be
determined so as to guarantee an equitable and well-balanced relation-
ship between the profits that investing companies or states reasonably
expect from the Antarctic venture and the contribution to develop-
ment that non-industrial states legitimately expect from the recovery
of non-renewable resources in a common space.4'
2. Application of the Common Heritage Principle to Negotiations for
a Mineral Regime
Having established the general applicability of the common heri-
tage principle to Antarctica, the question that follows is whether nego-
tiations for a mineral regime in a restricted forum (such as that of the
Consultative Parties) violate the common heritage principle. In my
view, the answer is no. Under the present structure of international
law, observance and implementation of substantive norms are, in prin-
ciple, left to the individual states. States are also free to negotiate and
conclude agreements provided that they do not run counter to the
principles ofjus cogens.42 But even if we were to admit hypothetically
that the common heritage principle is a principle ofjus cogens, the
only conclusion we could draw from such an assumption would be
that a conventional regime for mineral resources which is inconsistent
with the substantive principles enunciated above would be invalid. In
no way would the above assumption warrant the conclusion that mere
negotiations for the development of a mineral regime violate the com-
mon heritage principle for lack of universal participation.
B. PRESERVATION AND PROTECTION OF THE
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
The second principle applicable to the legality of mineral activi-
ties in Antarctica is the preservation and protection of the natural
environment. It is almost superfluous to recall that this principle has
41. It is not the task of this paper to propose exact figures as to the amount of such a
levy. However, on the basis of the experience of national laws on mineral exploitation of
the deep seabed area, a fair amount would be between 5% and 10%. An adjustment mech-
anism would be required in any case to account for the larger profits that normally will
accrue after the initial period of the investment.
42. The principle of jus cogens is set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties as follows:
A treaty is void if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm
of general international law. For the purpose of the present Convention, a peremp-
tory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation
is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law using the same character.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969).
reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).
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increasingly become a fundamental concept inspiring the development
of international law; the principle has had a significant impact on the
regulation of the marine environment, 43 the use of space,44 and the
concept of state responsibility for transboundary pollution.45 In par-
ticular, attempts to codify the notion of state responsibility for trans-
boundary pollution have produced a considerable degree of consensus
that serious damage to the natural and human environment gives rise
to an international crime, i.e., that such damage constitutes a wrongful
act involving responsibility to the international community as a whole
and not merely to the state or states specifically affected. 46
Despite the still undefined character of such an erga omnes obli-
gation, it seems indisputable that preservation of the Antarctic envi-
ronment was one of the fundamental goals of the trust created under
the Antarctic Treaty.47 This goal has come to be widely shared even
among the states that are not parties to the Antarctic Treaty, as is
evidenced by the repeated reference to the paramount importance of
environmental protection in current attempts to bring the matter
within U.N. jurisdiction and in the views of states attached to the Sec-
retary General's study.48
The principle of environmental protection of Antarctica will have
to be accepted as a legal restraint to mineral activities regardless of the
43. The principle of preservation and protection of the natural environment has limited
traditional freedom of the sea. See, e.g., International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S.
3 (entered intoforce July 26, 1958); Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962) (with subsequent
amendments); International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of
1973, as modified by Protocol of 1978, T.I.A.S. No. - (entered into force Oct. 2, 1983);
1982 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 31, part XII.
44. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, with Annex, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333,
T.I.A.S. No. 9614; Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13,
1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10541 (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983).
45. For an early application of the principle of international responsibility for trans-
boundary pollution, see the Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 1911 (1941).
46. Article 19 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Respon-
sibility, after defining the category of international crimes, exemplifies such wrongful acts
by reference to (a) aggression, (b) breach of self-determination of peoples, (c) slavery, geno-
cide, and apartheid, and "(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential
importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment .. " The
text of article 19 appears in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (part 2) 80 (1978).
47. This is shown not only by the general purposes and parameters set up by the
Antarctic Treaty, but by the great emphasis that the Consultative Parties have put on pro-
moting conservation measures. See supra note 2. For a thorough discussion of the various
aspects of environmental protection in the Antarctic area, see Joyner, The Southern Ocean
and Marine Pollution: Problems and Prospects, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 165 (1985).
48. See paragraph 3 of the Explanatory Memorandum attached to the request to
include Antarctica in the agenda of the Thirty-Eighth Session of the General Assembly,
supra note 23. For the views of states, see Report of the Secretary General, supra note 5.
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future territorial status of the continent. In other words, even if the
present territorial claims were to be partially or fully recognized as a
legal basis for a national concessionary model of mineral exploitation,
this could not be done without consideration for preserving the
Antarctic milieu in its entirety. The value of environmental integrity,
as is clearly proclaimed in the U.N. Stockholm Declaration of 1972,4 9
is indivisible. It is all the more so for Antarctica in that extension to
this continent of the traditional attributes of state sovereignty over ter-
ritory, exclusivity, and freedom 50 in the exercise of territorial jurisdic-
tion, presents much greater risks in view of the unity and fragility of
the pertinent ecosystem. Therefore, even if claimant states were to
consolidate their title, such consolidation could not involve the free-
dom to recklessly exploit mineral resources of the respective sectors.
Such freedom and the parallel exclusive character of state authority
over the relevant sector would still be limited by the general prohibi-
tion of massive degradation of the Antarctic environment, of total
depletion of mineral resources, and of compromising the balance
between the ecosystems of the continent. This conclusion is valid a
fortiori for a mineral regime of an international character under which
the terms, conditions, and oversight of exploitation activities depend
upon an intergovernmental authority to be constituted by treaty.
C. PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
The third set of principles that I consider relevant for assessing
the lawfulness of mineral exploitation of Antarctica are those related
to the structure and objectives of the new international economic
order.5' Despite the skepticism surrounding such a normative cate-
gory (especially as over ten years have elapsed since the enunciation of
the international economic order without its having been translated
into binding instruments), I believe that the political movement that
originated its demand has produced at least a sediment of general prin-
ciples. One such principle is the requirement that the inequalities
between industrialized states and less-developed countries not be wors-
ened by the unregulated introduction on the world market of raw
49. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stock-
holm Declaration of 1972), June 16, 1972, reprinted in REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1, at 3
(1973).
50. For an analysis of these two attributes of state sovereignty, see B. CONFORTI,
LEZIONI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 158 (1982).
51. The expression refers to a number of declarations and resolutions adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly and other U.N. bodies in the mid-1970's, among which the most
important are the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1979) and the Declaration on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, Sixth Special Sess.
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. I), U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
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materials and commodities from new sources which would cause a
sudden collapse in prices and a serious crisis for the economy of less-
developed producing countries. This principle is to be considered part
of emerging customary international law as is witnessed by its system-
atic adoption in international trade agreements concerning price stabi-
lization in commodities52 and by its incorporation in part XI of the
Law of the Sea Convention.5 3 The detailed regulations laid down in
article 150 of this Convention, although not necessarily applicable to
Antarctic mineral activities, are reflective of the same basic need for
some measure of restraint and regulation to reconcile the concept of
the common heritage principle with the eventual mineral exploitation
of Antarctica. A principle of laissez faire in this field is hardly com-
patible with the concept of common resources and with the need to
protect the less-developed countries whose economy would be
adversely affected by future mineral extraction from Antarctica.
III. SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED
MINERAL REGIME
The above analysis brings us to the conclusion that, although
there is a set of minimum legal restraints with which the future
Antarctic mineral regime will have to comply, such restraints do not
include the obligation to abstain from undertaking or pursuing negoti-
ations on this subject within the framework of the Consultative Par-
ties. On the basis of this assessment, I turn now to examine the main
52. Among the many examples of this practice are the pioneering 1956 International
Tin Agreement, 1014 U.N.T.S. 43 (revised June 26, 1981); the International Sugar Agree-
ment of 7 Oct. 1977, 1064 U.N.T.S. 219; the International Coffee Agreement of 3 Dec.
1975, 1024 U.N.T.S. 3; and the International Cocoa Agreement of 20 Oct. 1975, 1023
U.N.T.S. 253. The common feature of these agreements is that they provide mechanisms
of financing for buffer stocks of relevant commodities and "stabex" type of funds intended
to sustain prices in periods of sharp decline. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States, supra note 51, contains several references to the principle of balanced expansion
of world trade (art. 14), international cooperation for the purpose of facilitating economic
and social development (art. 17), of abstention from policies having a negative effect on the
national economics of developing countries (arts. 18, 23), and of special attention and duty
to the needs of the least developed among the developing countries, so as to develop eco-
nomic policies capable of overcoming present economic difficulties (art. 25).
53. The Convention provides that mineral exploitation of the seabed area "shall ... be
carried out in such a manner as to foster healthy development of the world economy and
balanced growth of international trade, and to promote international co-operation for the
overall development of all countries, especially the developing states .. " 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention, supra note 31, art. 150. Article 150 also indicates that one of the objec-
tives of the policies relating to the development of seabed resources is "the protection of
developing countries from adverse effects on their economies or on their export earnings
resulting from a reduction in the price of one affected mineral, or in the volume of that
mineral exported, to the extent that such reductions are caused by activities in the
Area .. " Id. art. 150(g).
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features and directions of the work currently being carried out within
the Consultative Group with a view toward drafting a mineral regime.
Two projects have so far been circulated among the Consultative
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty.54 Although both are still at a rather
general level of elaboration, a set of substantive principles and a skele-
ton of institutional machinery appear sufficiently developed to permit
a preliminary evaluation in light of the applicable principles drawn
from the Antarctic Treaty and from customary international law.
Both the German Draft and the Beeby Draft indicate that negoti-
ations are moving toward a mineral regime that is complementary to
the Antarctic Treaty and to the legal system that gradually developed
from it. This is clear from the Preamble and from article II, para-
graph 2(d) of both drafts, which reads: "The Antarctic Treaty Con-
sultative Parties shall retain an active and responsible role in relation
to all proposed or actual Antarctic mineral activities.155
This conservative statement is balanced by some procedural nov-
elties that tend to enlarge the scope of the decision-making process.
Starting with the meeting held at Rio de Janeiro in February-March,
1985, the Consultative Parties have agreed to invite other contracting
parties without consultative status to participate in the negotiations as
observers. This has enabled a group of sixteen states, some of whom
are actively seeking consultative status, 56 to be involved directly in the
negotiating process. Obviously this does not mean that the privileged
status of the Consultative Parties has been brought to an end. Even
from a procedural point of view, the difference between the two cate-
gories of contracting states is emphasized by restrictive rules for non-
Consultative Parties who are allowed to speak only after the full-
fledged partners have spoken. It is very likely, however, that despite
such formal distinctions, this new cooperative atmosphere will enable
the non-Consultative Parties to make an important contribution to the
shaping of the mineral regime by the very fact of their active participa-
tion. Further, a proposal has been made in recent negotiations for the
creation of a forum allowing participation by allparties to the eventual
mineral regime, regardless of their consultative status. This forum
could take the form of a special organ or an ad hoc conference where
some major decisions, such as the opening of an area for mineral activ-
ities, would be discussed.
Let us now examine the substantive features of the proposed
regime.
54. See supra notes 10-11.
55. Id. Article II, paragraph 2(d) of both draft proposals uses the identical language.




A. PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
The Preamble, article II, and article III of both the German and
Beeby Drafts incorporate the principle that Antarctic mineral activi-
ties may be carried out only within the framework of previously estab-
lished safeguards of the environment. This principle is specified in
detail through a set of norms which include: (1) the necessity for
impact assessment studies before any mineral activities take place;
(2) the requirement of prior adequate information concerning possible
risks and consequences of eventual accidents before any judgment is
passed on the feasibility of mineral activities; and (3) the prohibition of
any exploitation of mineral resources until technology and procedures
are available to cope with operating risks and eventual accidents. The
German Draft also contains a reference to a strict obligation concern-
ing the removal of pollutants and the disposal of industrial waste.57
These provisions represent a good starting point for further
improvement of the environmental guarantees as a condition for min-
eral activities in Antarctica. The revised text of the Beeby Draft
shows several signs of improvement, especially with regard to a new
article on protected areas and to the extension to the mineral actitivies
and installation of an inspection mechanism modeled on article VI of
the Antarctic Treaty. 58
B. SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS
The mineral regime proposed under the German and Beeby
Drafts attempts to resolve the delicate problem of preserving the prin-
ciples established in article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. This is very
important because no other activity carried out in Antarctica to date
has posed a threat to territorial claims comparable to the threat posed
by minerals exploitation. Article VII of both Drafts reiterates the
notion that nothing in the regime and in the activities carried out
while it is in force shall "constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or
denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty area
.... -59 The final provision of article VII confirms the familiar "freez-
ing clause" according to which no new claims or enlargement of
existing claims are admissible while the Antarctic Treaty is in force.
Two differences, however, exist at the present stage between the
Beeby Draft and the German Draft. First, the Drafts differ as to
57. German Draft, supra note 11, art. III(e).
58. A detailed analysis of these provisions and a judgment as to their adequacy will not
be attempted here because environmental protection is the specific subject of another paper
in this Conference. See Joyner, Protection of the Antarctic Environment: Rethinking the
Problems and Prospects, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 259 (1986).
59. Beeby Draft, supra note 10, art. VII; German Draft, supra note 11, art. VII.
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which claims to territorial sovereignty the freezing clause affects. The
German Draft contains the words "previously asserted"60 with refer-
ence to claims to territorial sovereignty, while the Beeby text speaks
generally of "any right or claim."' 61 The second difference is the inclu-
sion in the Beeby Draft of a reference to "coastal state jurisdiction, ' 62
whereas the German Draft speaks only of claims to "territorial sover-
eignty" within the Antarctic Treaty area. 63
Although the German Draft follows more faithfully the language
of the Antarctic Treaty, the Beeby text is more appropriate and precise
for the purpose of reconciling mineral activities with territorial claims.
The wording "previously asserted" rights or claims, in fact, could be
interpreted as referring to claims that were once asserted and later
abandoned. 64 This interpretation would, of course, be unacceptable
for those states who are still maintaining claims. Also, with respect to
the second difference, the Beeby text presents a better drafting tech-
nique. If, as seems probable, Antarctic mineral activities will be
located both on land and in marine areas, it will be necessary for the
mineral regime to apply the "stand still" clause to coastal state juris-
diction as well. A combination of the language of article IV of the
Antarctic Treaty and of article IV(2)(b) of the Convention on the Con-
servation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR),65 which
obviously is concerned with marine areas, seems to be the most appro-
priate solution.
Despite such drafting differences, current negotiations appear to
take fully into account and to further refine the principle laid down in
article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. Furthermore, the proposed draft
articles provide that parties to the mineral regime shall observe,
whether or not they are parties to the Antarctic Treaty, the various
instruments adopted within its framework. The most notable of these
instruments are the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of
Antarctic Fauna and Flora,66 CCAMLR, 67 and the Convention for
60. German Draft, supra note 11, art. VII(b).
61. Beeby Draft, supra note 10, art. VII(b).
62. Id.
63. German Draft, supra note 11, art. VII(b).
64. Article VII, paragraph l(b) of the German Draft notes:
Nothing in the regime and no acts or activities taking place while the present
regime is in force shall ... be interpreted as a renunciation or dimunition by any
Party of, or as prejudicing any previously asserted right or claim or basis of claim
to territorial sovereignty within the Antarctic Treaty Area .. "
65. Nothing in this convention and no acts or activities taking place while the pres-
ent Convention is in force shall ... be interpreted as a renunciation or diminution
by any Contracting Party of, or as prejudicing, any right or claim or basis of claim
to exercise coastal state jurisdiction under international law within the area to
which this Convention applies ....
CCAMLR, supra note 2, art. IV, para. 2(b).
66. Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, supra note 2.
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the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. 68
C. THE LINK BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE OPERATOR OF
MINERAL ACTIVITIES
Antarctic mineral activities are likely to be carried out by private
or public operators as distinct from the states party to the regime.
This possibility requires that a state-operator link be established to
ensure compliance with the regime and the obligations arising from its
implementation. The Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 establishes a
precedent for resolving this problem; the Convention lays down the
concept of "sponsoring states" in the machinery for exploitation of the
deep seabed.69 In turn, this concept is borrowed from the institution
of diplomatic protection where the nationality link is the prerequisite
for protective intervention.
The mineral regime negotiations account for the need to establish
a state-operator link by requiring every operator to have a "substantial
and genuine link" with a state that is party to the Treaty and by
requiring every operator to have a "sponsoring state." This solution
does not present any particular difficulty in the case of uninational
operators. In these cases, the controlling factors would be the nation-
ality, in the case of natural persons, or the criterion of incorporation in
the sponsoring state, in the case of corporate entities. The location of
management, control, and resources in the territory of the sponsoring
state may also be factors.
Problems are likely to arise, however, when multinational opera-
tors, groups of companies, consortia, and joint ventures are involved.
In those cases, the effective enforcement of regulatory measures may
be hampered with regard to components of the multinational group
that are beyond the reach of the state jurisdiction. The best approach
to this problem is to adopt a criterion of "effectivity," i.e., to select as
sponsoring state the state in whose territory the actual control, man-
agement, and use of resources is located. When, as in the case of joint
ventures, this approach leads to more than one state, the sponsoring
state will necessarily be determined by agreement between the inter-
ested parties.
67. CCAMLR, supra note 2.
68. Seal Convention, supra note 2.
69. Among the entities which the Convention provides may carry out mineral activities
in the area are "natural or juridicial persons which possess the Nationality of States Parties
or are effectively controlled by them or their nationals, when sponsored by such States, or
any group of the foregoing .... " 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 31, art. 153,
para. 2(b). See also id., art. 4, para. 3 of Annex III (referring to the basic ambitions of
prospecting, exploration, and exploitation); id., art. 139 (establishing the principle of state
responsibility to ensure compliance with the minerals regime by sponsored entities and
liability for damage).
1986]
182 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
The adoption of the "sponsoring state" feature in the mineral
regime also appears to be important because of the related issue of
international responsibility. Rules on imputablility and "due dili-
gence" are still rather vague in the law of state responsibility for
wrongful acts commited by private parties. Therefore, it seems desira-
ble to guarantee that, in addition to the individual operator's liability
for loss or damage caused by its mineral activities, the possibility exists
of recourse against a state party for its failure to secure compliance
with the regime. For this purpose, the designation of the sponsoring
state is a useful and even a necessary element for the attribution of
responsibility and for the working of an effective system of remedies.
IV. THE MINERAL REGIME AS AN INSTITUTION
While it may prove relatively easy to reach a consensus on the
aforementioned substantive principles, the institutional aspects of the
mineral regime still remain a rather controversial issue in the negotia-
tions presently underway.
The first question posed by the establishment of an institutional
structure having jurisdiction over mineral resources concerns the open
or the restricted character of the organs of that institution. The alter-
natives are a model in which all the parties to the mineral regime and
the acceding states will be represented in the organs, and a model
based on the "closed shop" philosophy of the Antarctic Treaty. The
latter would involve representation only of the Consultative Parties
and of those states which show a substantial interest in the concrete
development of Antarctic resources. So far, the majority of the Con-
tracting Parties share a preference for the "closed shop," confirming
their preference for the continuity of the Antarctic Treaty philosophy.
The two superpowers strongly favor such a model.
Yet the question must be asked, whether the "closed shop" model
is consistent with the common heritage of mankind, a principle that
we have considered applicable to Antarctic resources. The answer to
this is already partially provided by our previous observations on the
nature, content, and present limitations of the common heritage prin-
ciple. 70 This principle remains a "primary norm"-to use Hart's ter-
minology 7 -not accompanied by any "secondary rule" contemplating
the mechanism of implementation. In other words, the common heri-
tage principle presents only a substantive dimension involving the obli-
gation to use certain spaces and finite resources so as to satisfy not
only the selfish national interest of a few technologically advanced
states, likely to be favored by the rule prior in tempore potior in jure,
70. See supra Part II(A)(1).
71. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 2 (1961).
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but the interest of all mankind. So far, this general principle is not
accompanied by the obligation to entrust the management of common
resources to a universal agency having the monopoly power of
implementation.
An example of the missing implementation mechanism is the
great difficulties that exist in creating consensus on part XI (the Inter-
national Seabed Authority) of the Law of the Sea Convention. In this
case, it is not the recognition of the international seabed area as the
common heritage of mankind that precludes consensus, 72 but skepti-
cism about the efficiency and reliability of a system where the common
heritage principle is entrusted to a rather baroque international
bureaucracy. The unavoidable split between the substantive content of
the common heritage principle and the institutional overstructure that
should implement it generates an increasing tendency to consider
states free to take the principle in "their own hands" and to unilater-
ally regulate the exploration and exploitation of common resources on
the basis of their "spontaneous" observance of the common heritage
principle. This tendency has led a number of states to enact national
laws permitting unilateral exploration, and possible exploitation at a
later stage, of deep seabed minerals.73
Further arguments exist with respect to Antarctica that support
the legality of a mineral regime of restricted participation. First, it
may be argued that the Consultative Parties group-which comprises
the two super powers, the industrial states of the West, socialist states,
less-developed countries, and even South Africa-is already pluralistic
in character. Second, it may be argued that the "entrance fee"
required to become an active part of the decision-making institution is
reasonable. Such an entrance fee, insofar as it relates to the capacity
to organize an Antarctic station or to engage in a scientific expedition,
is the guarantee of technical expertise and scientific accountability of
all states involved in Antarctic activities74 and in the related decision-
72. One may recall that the United States, the staunchest opponent of Part XI of the
Law of the Sea Convention, did not oppose the adoption of the common heritage of man-
kind principle with respect to the deep seabed resources. On the contrary, the United
States voted in favor of Resolution 2749 of 1970 on the Principles Concerning the Seabed
and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
73. See United States 1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1473 (1983). Other nations have passed similar legislation. See, e.g., 20 I.L.M.
393 (1981) (Federal Republic of West Germany); 27 I.L.M. 832 (1982) (Great Britain); 20
I.L.M. 1217 (1981) (France); 21 I.L.M. 808 (1982) (USSR); 21 I.L.M. 551 (1982) (Japan);
22 I.L.M. 102 (1983) (Italy). The Italian law of Feb. 20, 1985, is reprinted in 68 RIVisTA
DIR. INT'L 241 (1985). For a comment on these laws, see Luoma, A Comparative Study of
National Legislation Concerning the Deep Sea Mining of Manganese Nodules, 14 J. MAR. L.
& CoM. 243 (1983).
74. See Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. 9, para. 2.
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making process.
As far as the structure of the institution is concerned, present
negotiations envisage the establishment of three organs. The first
organ (the Commission) would include all states party to the regime
and would have general competence to authorize submission of appli-
cations for the development of mineral activities, the regulation of
prospecting, the evaluation of environmental impact of mineral activi-
ties, and the reservation of areas for scientific, ecological, or historic
reasons. 75 The second organ would be an advisory body (Advisory or
Scientific Committee) which would perform consultative functions on
scientific, environmental, and technical matters.76 Finally, an execu-
tive organ (Regulatory Committee in the Beeby Draft, or Executive
Committee in the German Draft) would regulate and monitor mineral
activities in a given area. 77
There appears to be consensus among the Consultative Parties as
to the Commission. Objections and difficulties have emerged, how-
ever, with respect to the Regulatory or Executive Committee. The
main feature of this organ under the present Draft is that it is to be
constituted in relation to each area opened for exploration and
exploitation. The organ is to be composed of states which are them-
selves, or through their nationals, engaged in mineral activities in the
relevant area, and of the states who maintain a claim in that area, as
well as of other claimant-state members of the Commission, up to a
maximum of three. This solution, although understandable as entice-
ment for claimant states to accept a joint mineral regime, represents
the first and the only open recognition of an entitlement of claimant
states over the claimed area. In this respect, it represents an indirect
disavowal of article VII of the Draft which purports to ensure that
article IV of the Antarctic Treaty-freezing of claims-is not affected.
It is difficult to see how the freezing of claims will not be affected if the
regime gives claimant states a privileged position-and perhaps a right
of veto-in the decision-making affecting the area opened for
exploration.
Some effect on the freezing of claims seems all the more likely
when we think how important the role of the Executive Committee
will be in implementing the mineral regime. Its function would
include establishing terms, conditions, and fees for mineral develop-
ment at each site; the preparation and adoption of the so-called man-
agement scheme, which is the concessionary instrument within whose
framework mineral activities are to be carried out; as well as maintain-
75. Beeby Draft, supra note 10, art. X; German Draft, supra 11, art. X.
76. Beeby Draft, supra note 10, art. XVI; German Draft, supra note 11, art. XVI.
77. Beeby Draft, supra note 10, art. XX; German Draft, supra note 11, art. XX.
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ing operations and, if required, undertaking a revision plan. These
functions admittedly require a specific administrative body different
from the Commission. However, it appears that the present draft arti-
cles go too far in attributing administrative and management powers
to an organ (the Committee) in which the necessary and decisive pres-
ence of the claimant states is tantamount to recognition of sovereignty.
Given this sensitive issue, it is not surprising that the two Drafts
currently circulating among the Consultative Parties differ to some
extent not only with respect to the name of the committee, but also
with respect to its composition. The German Draft, on the one hand,
contemplates a de jure membership of the state(s) on whose request
(or on the request of whose nationals) the area was opened, and of the
state(s) (members of the Commission) who assert claims in the area,
with additional members selected by the requesting state(s) to ensure
that the Committee is composed of four claimant states and four non-
claimant states.78 The Beeby Draft, on the other hand, guarantees
membership to "the two states which, prior to the entry into force of
this regime, maintained the largest presence in Antarctica. ' 79 Obvi-
ously, this refers to the United States and the Soviet Union.
A possible way out of the claims dilemma is to devise an organ-
preferably denominated "executive committee"-which, although
charged with important supervisory and implementing functions,
neither controls access to the relevant area nor holds power to deter-
mine the amount of royalties to be paid by the operation engaged in
mineral actitivies. This modification could be achieved by shifting the
basis of the decision-making system from the rights of claimants, as
recognized in the present drafts, to the functions of the organ with
general competence, the Commission. This organ would therefore be
responsible for fixing in detail the terms, conditions, and guidelines for
mineral activities.
The advantage of this system would be an a priori uniform stan-
dard of regulation and a clear and certain picture of the legal basis on
which perspective applications will be evaluated. But, most impor-
tantly, the decision-making powers would be retained in the organ in
which all parties to the mineral regime are represented; decision-mak-
ing would not be decentralized to an organ in which the particular
interests of the claimant state(s) and of the state(s) involved in min-
eral operations are paramount. This solution would not require that
one of the key elements of the mineral regime-the so-called "manage-
78. German Draft, supra note 11, art. XX.
79. Beeby Draft, supra note 10, art. XX.
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ment scheme"-be abolished.80 It would only require that such an
instrument either be approved by the Commission (rather than by the
Regulatory or Executive Committee as in the present draft), or that,
although approved by such a Committee, its content would be
restricted to oversight of mineral activities. The solution would thus
represent a change in the management scheme, which today is consid-
ered as a comprehensive set of regulations following the model of a
concession contract in national administrative law with all the related
flavor of sovereignty.
A final point concerns the question of decision-making proce-
dures followed in the bodies of delegated authority. Current negotia-
tions appear to favor a two-thirds majority for deliberations on
substantive matters and a simple majority of the members present
when voting on procedural matters. This system applies to the Com-
mission and to the Advisory Committee; 81 the Regulatory Committee
should, in principle, decide by simply majority. 82
This voting system departs from the rule of consensus which
characterizes decision-making under the Antarctic Treaty. The rea-
son for this departure is obviously a practical one: the desire to avoid
the risk of paralysis in an already complex decision-making process.
At least two arguments, however, can be made in favor of consensus.
First, the claimant states argue that no decision with respect to the
claimed area should be made without their consent. Second, states
such as the Soviet Union and the United States, who, although not
claimant states, reserve the right to maintain access to the whole of the
Antarctic continent, likewise argue that no decision with respect to
claimed areas should be made without their consent. Support for a
consensus system may involve a desire to prevent the establishment of
a majority decision-making process that could foreclose access in spe-
cific areas to these two states or their nationals.8 3
Despite these conflicting interests and the preference for consen-
sus sometimes expressed in legal literature, 4 majority rule 'seems the
better solution for a mineral regime that will unavoidably go beyond
the scope of the Consultative Parties. In fact, we cannot ignore that
while consensus has proved to be a successful system with respect to
80. The "management scheme" is contemplated in the Beeby Draft, supra note 10, arts.
XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXV.
81. Beeby Draft, supra note 10, arts. XV, XIX; German Draft, supra note 11, arts. XV,
XIX.
82. Cf art. XX of Draft Articles, supra notes 10 and 11.
83. For the U.S. position, see Colson, The United States Position on Antarctica, 19 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 291 (1986). The Soviet position is conveniently presented by Boczek, The
Soviet Union and the Antarctic Regime, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 834 (1984).
84. See generally Wolfrum, supra note 37, at 185. Wolfrum nevertheless expresses
some reservations about the wisdom of extending consensus to "newcomers." Id. at 159.
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the Consultative Parties, the same may not be true with respect to a
potentially much larger group of states party to the mineral regime.
Consensus requires exercise in self-restraint on the part of each indi-
vidual state who ultimately is given a veto power against the will of the
majority. Self-restraint comes more easily with the long-term experi-
ence of working in the rather closely knit group of the Consultative
Parties. In a more heterogeneous mineral resources institution, the
states who have been outsiders to the Antarctic system may generate
new attitudes, contentious relationships, and a more frequent inclina-
tion to resort to the veto. For these reasons, I tend to support the
choice of majority rule, perhaps with the possibility of resorting to
consensus in the most important of all the minerals decisions, that is,
the opening of a new area for mineral exploration and exploitation.
CONCLUSION
The prospect of a commercially viable exploitation of Antarctic
mineral resources is still rather uncertain. It is clear, however, that
the interest in mineral activities in that continent has gone well beyond
the merely speculative stage and has entered the phase of concrete dip-
lomatic negotiations.
Whether, and to what extent, such negotiations will succeed in
bridging the gap between conflicting interests in Antarctica-claimant
states and non-claimant states, Consultative Parties and non-Consulta-
tive Parties, Treaty States and Third States-will much depend upon
the ability of the future conventional regime to remain consistent with
the principles of the Antarctic Treaty and to fashion a system accepta-
ble to the international community at large.
The Antarctic Treaty permits the development of mineral activi-
ties under the following conditions: (1) the activities remain "peace-
ful" in the sense of involving no military use of mining installations;
(2) the activities not jeopardize the "freezing" of sovereignty claims
which is the mainstay of the present Antarctic system; and (3) the
activities continue to guarantee the freedom of scientific research and
the protection of the Antarctic environment in its entirety. The 1977
Moratorium Recommendation on mineral exploration and exploita-
tion takes the position that such a moratorium is a self-imposed
restraint for the purpose of evaluating the development of a conven-
tional framework for mineral activities. The moratorium recommen-
dation, rather than hindering the undertaking of negotiations for the
development of a mineral regime, has become the natural springboard
for negotiations.
From the point of view of general international law, analysis
starts from the premise that Antarctica is a res communis omnium to
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which the principle of common heritage of mankind applies. The
nearly twenty-five years of successful international management of
Antarctica, the continuing observance of the freezing of territorial
claims, and the remarkable level of cooperation achieved by a non-
homogeneous group of participants, is evidence of the sense of respon-
sibility that the Parties to the Antarctic Treaty maintain toward the
international community as a whole. Recognition of the previous
international management does not imply, however, that mineral
activities are unlawful unless carried out within an international insti-
tution of a universal character. The common heritage principle, like
most rules of international law, may be observed and implemented
through self-imposed limitations, restraints, and safeguards so that
states involved in mineral activities in Antarctica will behave not only
uti singuli, in the pursuit of their national interest, but also uti universi,
as interpreters and guarantors of the interests of mankind, in the con-
servation of the Antarctic environment and in the rational use of its
resources.
As international lawyers, we are accustomed to think, and teach,
that law is the product of facts. In the case of mineral activities in
Antarctica, however, the law must somehow develop before the facts
are accomplished. This is true not only because the risk of unregu-
lated mineral exploration and exploitation is too great for the environ-
mental integrity of Antarctica, but also because of the political and
legal principle that infuses contemporary international law: common
resources may not be allocated according to the primitive first come,
first served rule, but must be subject to some governance that will
include effective access and equitable sharing today as tomorrow, for
all participants of the world community and for future generations: In
such a governance rests the true essence of the common heritage spirit.
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